A quinizmussal küzdők egyik legnagyobb akadálya, hogy az orvosi közösségben jelenleg nincsenek ismeretek erről. A kvinizmusban szenvedők többsége azt tapasztalta, hogy háziorvosuk és más egészségügyi szakemberek vagy nem ismerik a témát, vagy szkeptikusak ezzel kapcsolatban. Valami, amire gyakran felmerül a kérdés, hogy „milyen információkkal szolgálhatok / adhatok a háziorvosomnak a kinizmusról?”
Linkek értékes cikkekhez
Felsoroltam néhány olyan folyóiratcikket, amelyet a betegek adhatnak orvosuknak, és értékes információkat nyújtanak számukra. Vagy másolhatja és beillesztheti az alábbi linkeket, hogy megadja nekik, vagy letöltheti és kinyomtathatja egy nyomtatott példányt, amelyet megad nekik.
Bár ezek az akadémiai cikkek angol nyelven íródtak, orvosának képesnek kell lennie azok elolvasására vagy arra, hogy könnyen lefordítsa őket.
Ezeket a cikkeket Dr. Remington Nevin, a Quinism Alapítvány írta.
A tüneti meflokin expozíció szűrése krónikus pszichiátriai tünetekkel rendelkező veteránok körében
Uno dei maggiori ostacoli che devono affrontare coloro che soffrono di chinismo è l’attuale mancanza di conoscenza a riguardo all’interno della comunità medica in generale. La maggior parte delle persone affette da chinismo ha scoperto che il proprio medico di famiglia e altri professionisti sanitari non conoscono l’argomento o sono scettici al riguardo. Qualcosa che viene chiesto frequentemente è “quali informazioni ci sono che posso / devo fornire al mio medico di famiglia sul chinismo?”
Collegamenti per articoli di valore
Ho elencato alcuni articoli di riviste che i pazienti possono fornire al proprio medico che fornirà loro preziose informazioni. Puoi copiare e incollare i link sottostanti per darli a loro o scaricare e stampare una copia cartacea da dare loro.
Sebbene questi articoli accademici siano scritti in inglese, il tuo medico dovrebbe essere in grado di leggerli o avere la capacità di tradurli facilmente.
Questi articoli sono stati scritti dal Dr. Remington Nevin della Quinism Foundation.
Screening per l’esposizione sintomatica alla meflochina tra i veterani con sintomi psichiatrici cronici
Links zu entsprechenden wissenschaftlichen Artikeln.
Eine der größten Hürden für Menschen mit Quinismus ist der derzeitige Mangel an Wissen darüber in der gesamten medizinischen Gemeinschaft. Die meisten Menschen mit Quinismus haben festgestellt, dass der Hausarzt und andere Angehörige der Gesundheitsberufe entweder keine Kenntnisse über das Thema haben oder skeptisch sind. Häufig wird gefragt: „Welche Informationen kann / sollte ich meinem Hausarzt über Quinismus geben?“
Links für wertvolle Artikel
Ich habe einige Zeitschriftenartikel aufgelistet, die Patienten ihrem Arzt geben können und die ihnen wertvolle Informationen liefern. Sie können entweder die folgenden Links kopieren und einfügen, um sie zu geben, oder eine Hardcopy herunterladen und ausdrucken, um sie ihnen zu geben.
Obwohl diese wissenschaftlichen Artikel in englischer Sprache verfasst sind, sollte Ihr Arzt sie lesen oder leicht übersetzen lassen können.
Diese Artikel wurden von Dr. Remington Nevin von der Quinism Foundation verfasst.
Screening auf symptomatische Mefloquin-Exposition bei Veteranen mit chronischen psychiatrischen Symptomen
Stellen Sie sicher, dass Sie diese Informationen mit allen teilen. Sollte ich auf weitere Informationen aufmerksam gemacht werden, die sich als hilfreich für Sie erweisen, werde ich Sie auf dem Laufenden halten.
L’un des plus grands obstacles auxquels sont confrontés les personnes atteintes de quinisme est le manque actuel de connaissances à ce sujet au sein de la communauté médicale en général. La plupart des personnes atteintes de quinisme ont constaté que leur médecin de famille et les autres professionnels de la santé ne connaissaient pas le sujet ou étaient sceptiques à ce sujet. Quelque chose qui est fréquemment demandé est «quelles informations puis-je / devrais fournir à mon médecin de famille sur le quinisme?»
Liens vers des articles précieux
J’ai énuméré quelques articles de journaux que les patients peuvent donner à leur professionnel de la santé qui leur fourniront des informations précieuses. Vous pouvez soit copier et coller les liens ci-dessous pour leur donner, soit télécharger et imprimer une copie papier pour leur donner.
Bien que ces articles académiques soient en anglais, votre médecin devrait être en mesure de les lire ou avoir la possibilité de les faire traduire facilement.
Ces articles ont été écrits par le Dr Remington Nevin de la Quinism Foundation.
Dépistage de l’exposition symptomatique à la méfloquine chez les vétérans présentant des symptômes psychiatriques chroniques
Een van de grootste hindernissen waarmee mensen met quinisme worden geconfronteerd, is het huidige gebrek aan kennis hierover binnen de medische gemeenschap in het algemeen. De meeste mensen met quinisme hebben gemerkt dat hun huisarts en andere beroepsbeoefenaren in de gezondheidszorg ofwel geen kennis van het onderwerp hebben, of er sceptisch over zijn. Iets dat vaak wordt gevraagd is: “welke informatie kan / moet ik mijn huisarts geven over quinisme?”
Links naar waardevolle artikelen
Ik heb een paar tijdschriftartikelen opgesomd die patiënten aan hun medische professional kunnen geven en die hen waardevolle informatie zullen geven. U kunt de onderstaande links kopiëren en plakken om ze te geven, of u kunt een papieren versie downloaden en afdrukken om aan hen te geven.
Hoewel de academische artikelen in het Engels zijn, moet uw arts ze kunnen lezen of gemakkelijk kunnen laten vertalen.
Deze artikelen zijn geschreven door Dr. Remington Nevin van de Quinism Foundation.
Screening op symptomatische blootstelling aan mefloquine bij veteranen met chronische psychiatrische symptomen
En af de største forhindringer for dem med kinisme er den nuværende mangel på viden om det inden for det medicinske samfund som helhed. De fleste af dem med kinisme har fundet ud af, at deres familielæge og andre sundhedspersonale enten mangler kendskab til emnet eller er skeptiske over for det. Noget, der ofte bliver spurgt, er “hvilke oplysninger er der, som jeg kan / skal give min huslæge om kinisme?”
Links til værdifulde artikler
Jeg har opført et par tidsskriftsartikler, som patienter kan give til deres læge, der giver værdifuld information til dem. Du kan enten kopiere og indsætte nedenstående links for at give dem eller downloade og udskrive en hard kopi for at give dem.
Selvom de akademiske artikler er skrevet på engelsk, skal din læge være i stand til at læse dem eller have evnen til at få dem oversat.
Disse artikler blev skrevet af Dr. Remington Nevin fra Quinism Foundation.
Screening for symptomatisk eksponering for mefloquin blandt veteraner med kroniske psykiatriske symptomer
Jedna od najvećih prepreka s kojom se suočavaju oni koji imaju kvinizam jest trenutni nedostatak znanja o njemu unutar medicinske zajednice u cjelini. Većina oboljelih od kvinizma otkrila je da obiteljski liječnik i drugi zdravstveni radnici ili nemaju dovoljno znanja o toj temi, ili su skeptični prema tome. Nešto što se često pita je “koje informacije o kvinizmu mogu / trebam pružiti svom obiteljskom liječniku?”
Linkovi za vrijedne članke
Nabrojao sam nekoliko članaka iz časopisa koje pacijenti mogu dati svom medicinskom osoblju koji će im pružiti dragocjene informacije. Možete kopirati i zalijepiti donje poveznice da biste im dali ili ih preuzmite i ispišite u tiskanom obliku.
Iako su ovi članci napisani na engleskom, vaš će liječnik vjerojatno moći čitati engleski ili se dogovoriti za njihovo prevođenje.
Ove je članke napisao dr. Remington Nevin iz fondacije Quinism.
Provjeravanje simptomatske izloženosti meflokinu među veteranima s kroničnim psihijatrijskim simptomima
Incredible testimony by former ADF senior officer.
I’m currently working on another major story involving criminality and corruption within the Australian government and the Australian Defense Force, and I thought I would give you a peek at what it’s about and some of what will be included in it.
It’s formally known as the “Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee Inquiry into the National Commissioner for Defence and Veteran Suicide Prevention Bill 2020 and the National Commissioner for Defence and Veteran Suicide Prevention (Consequential Amendments) Bill 2020”. It is yet another in a string of previous inquiries looking into mental health issues and suicide prevention among ADF veterans.
They don’t believe mefloquine toxicity is real.
I have obtained the complete and unredacted testimony and body of evidence that was given to the committee by a former senior officer in October of this year. Among the evidence were copies of these email communications made by officials within the Australian Ministry of Defense. It is clear that despite the evidence, the Australian Department of Defense continues to refuse to believe in mefloquine toxicity and the fact that thousands of veterans are suffering or have died because of it.
Many more will suffer and die unless the Australian government wakes up and decides to actually do something about the problem.
From: on behalf of CCS.MENTAL.SOCIAL.HEALTH To: Kelaher, Cath DR; Williams, Felicity DR; Ross, Victoria DR 1 Subject: Invitation to participate in Anti-malarial Health Assessment Co-design Workshop (23 January 2020) [SEC=UNCLASSIFIED] Date: Friday, 20 December 2019 5:17:51 PM
As you know, a number of veterans are of the view that they are suffering an acquired brain injury due to taking anti-malarial medications Mefloquine or Tafenoquine 20 years ago. There was a Senate inquiry into this very issue in 2018 which found there was no evidence to support this but noted that those who believed this have real symptoms (possibly related to many other factors) and should be offered care.
Leonie Nowland, Assistant Secretary, Client Coordination and Support
From: Ross, Victoria DR 1 To: Kelaher, Cath DR; Tindall, Katherine CAPT – RAN; Lawson, Stephen CAPT – RAN 2; Williams, Felicity DR Subject: prep for DVA co-design workshop [SEC=UNCLASSIFIED] Date: Monday, 2 September 2019 10:21:00 AM Attachments: 20190322 GP Clinical management guidelines – veterans with complex health issues.pdf UK GWS assessment.pdf AFP Managing unexplained symptoms in GP 2015.pdf
Hi everyone, I think we’re still meeting with DVA this Wednesday although it’s a bit confusing. Attached is some background info, perhaps we could discuss our position on Tuesday so we’re all on the same page. From my perspective the issues are · It’s not all about the mefloquine. The veterans at whom this assessment is aimed are those with complex symptomatology/conditions who aren’t accessing health care or feel that they are not receiving the ‘right’ health care. The intent is to improve engagement with the health care system and appropriate care to optimise their health and wellbeing. It’s about acknowledging their concerns, assessing their symptoms and finding a way forward. We are concerned that there is potential for the doctors doing the assessment to accept and/or reinforce that mefloquine/tafenoquine are the cause of the veteran’s poor health etc. · This health assessment appears to be in addition to the extant Veteran Health Check. Does it need to be? · How does continuity of care factor in. If this assessment is done by a BUPA provider, will they continue on as the veteran’s GP? The primary issue is that these veterans are not engaged with or don’t trust the system. There is a risk that their care may become even more fragmented. Cheers, Vicki
Dr. Victoria Ross Senior Medical Advisor, Military Population Health CP3-7-091 Department of Defence
Evidence was also given about an incident involving a hand grenade and a soldier senior commanders would later refer to as “Boom Boom”.
On the evening of 11 December 2000, Private Christopher Carter and a colleague were posted on sentry duty in a guard tower at the D Company forward operating base (FOB) near Aidabeleten village. Private Carter had previously exhibited behavioural symptoms consistent with quinoline poisoning, but a decision was made for him to continue taking the trial anti-malarial drug. On this occasion, Private Carter became psychotic, took an ADF F1 grenade from his colleague, removed the pin and dropped or threw the grenade. The grenade exploded and Private Carter was injured by the blast.
The 1 RAR chain of command immediately fabricated a cover story for this adverse event and the resulting grenade accident. ADF operational reports, United Nations reports and media reports of the incident state that D Company was attacked by a suspected East Timorese militiaman, who purportedly threw a grenade or explosive device into the D Company FOB.1819 On 12 December 2000, ADF media spokesperson Major David Munro stated:
“Suspected militia threw an explosive device. We can’t ascertain whether or not it was a hand grenade or a home-made device. In the explosion Private Christopher Carter was wounded or suffered minor shrapnel wounds to the lower left leg and also in the buttock”
In response to the purported “attack,” a helicopter was called in to evacuate Private Carter to Dili for medical treatment. A quick reaction force of helicopters, armoured vehicles and additional troops was called in to conduct a security sweep around the FOB. The following morning, Major Stothart ordered soldiers from D Company to conduct a security clearance of Aidabeleten village, on the false pretext of the purported “attack” the previous night, and to search for the “suspected militia” or related evidence of the “attack.” During a subsequent formal ADF “investigation” into the incident, several of the D Company soldiers informed the investigators that the grenade in question was an ADF F1 grenade, not a “militia” grenade or other explosive device. The official version of these events is a complete fabrication, regardless whether it occurred during a clinical drug trial.
The Aidabeleten grenade incident is probably the most spectacular cover-up of an adverse drug reaction in the history of clinical trials, however it is only one of the many severe ADRs which were covered up during Study 033 and the other AMI quinoline drug trials…
Submission to the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee Inquiry into the National Commissioner for Defence and Veteran Suicide Prevention Bill 2020 and the National Commissioner for Defence and Veteran Suicide Prevention (Consequential Amendments) Bill 2020
The government should now drop all charges, unless it cares to admit that what they are doing is a vendetta disguised as criminal justice.
Since I last wrote about the case of Australian whistleblower David McBride in Soul of Darkness back in August there have been some major developments to report on. Last Thursday a long awaited report of the findings of an inquiry looking into reports of possible war crimes committed by Australian SAS troops in Afghanistan between 2005 and 2016.
In 2016 the Inspector General of the Australian Defense Force appointed a justice of the New South Wales Court of Appeal, Major General Paul Brereton, to head an inquiry that would determine the veracity of rumors surrounding possible war crimes being committed by ADF troops in Afghanistan. It was to be called The Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force Afghanistan Inquiry, though it was more popularly known as the Brereton Inquiry.
In the 2017-18 IGDAF Annual Report the focus of the inquiry was stated to be:
…an administrative process, not a criminal investigation. This process is intended not only to ascertain whether there has been misconduct, but equally to exonerate those who may be affected by unsubstantiated rumours and allegations.
As CDF directed IGADF to conduct the Inquiry, the Inquiry has powers to compel the production of evidence similar to those of a Royal Commission.
The following year, the Annual Report reflected that as of June 30th, 2019 the Inquiry was examining:
55 separate incidents or issues covering a range of alleged breaches of the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), predominantly unlawful killings of persons who were non-combatants or were no longer combatants, but also ‘cruel treatment’ of such persons and
incidents relevant to the organisational, operational and cultural environment which may have enabled the alleged LOAC breaches.
The final report of the Inquiry that has been issued for public release has had large portions of redacted, but a vast majority of its findings remain uncovered and they reveal reports of disturbing behaviour.
The Law of Armed Conflict and International Humanitarian Law prohibit as war crimes the murder and cruel treatment of non-combatants and persons who are hors-de-combat (that is, outof-the fight because they have been seriously wounded, or have surrendered or been captured and are prisoners or ‘persons under control’), in a non-international armed conflict, which the war in Afghanistan was. Those binding international law obligations are implemented in Australian criminal law and they applied to all Australian Defence Force members on Operation SLIPPER. Australian Defence Force members were and are extensively trained on this subject, and the Inquiry did not encounter a single witness who claimed to be under any misunderstanding as to what was prohibited. Uniformly, everyone understood that it was impermissible to use lethal force against a prisoner (or ‘person under control’), or against a non-combatant.
In 28 incidents the subject of detailed examination (and a further 11 which were discontinued), the Inquiry has found that rumours, allegations or suspicions of a breach of Law of Armed Conflict are not substantiated.
However, the Inquiry has found that there is credible information of 23 incidents in which one or more non-combatants or persons hors-de-combat were unlawfully killed by or at the direction of members of the Special Operations Task Group in circumstances which, if accepted by a jury, would be the war crime of murder, and a further two incidents in which a non-combatant or person horsde-combat was mistreated in circumstances which, if so accepted, would be the war crime of cruel treatment. Some of these incidents involved a single victim, and some multiple victims.
These incidents involved:
a. a total of 39 individuals killed, and a further two cruelly treated; and
b. a total of 25 current or former Australian Defence Force personnel who were perpetrators, either as principals or accessories, some of them on a single occasion and a few on multiple occasions.
None of these are incidents of disputable decisions made under pressure in the heat of battle. The cases in which it has been found that there is credible information of a war crime are ones in which it was or should have been plain that the person killed was a non-combatant, or hors-de-combat. While a few of these are cases of Afghan local nationals encountered during an operation who were on no reasonable view participating in hostilities, the vast majority are cases where the persons were killed when hors-de-combat because they had been captured and were persons under control, and as such were protected under international law, breach of which was a crime.
It goes on further to state:
The Inquiry also found that there is credible information that some members of the Special Operations Task Group carried ‘throwdowns’ – foreign weapons or equipment, typically though not invariably easily concealable such as pistols, small hand held radios (‘ICOMs’), weapon magazines and grenades – to be placed with the bodies of ‘enemy killed in action’ for the purposes of site exploitation photography, in order to portray that the person killed had been carrying the weapon or other military equipment when engaged and was a legitimate target. This practice probably originated for the less egregious though still dishonest purpose of avoiding scrutiny where a person who was legitimately engaged turned out not to be armed. But it evolved to be used for the purpose of concealing deliberate unlawful killings.
In different Special Operations Task Group rotations, the Inquiry has found that there is credible information that junior soldiers were required by their patrol commanders to shoot a prisoner, in order to achieve the soldier’s first kill, in a practice that was known as ‘blooding’. This would happen after the target compound had been secured, and local nationals had been secured as ‘persons under control’. Typically, the patrol commander would take a person under control and the junior member, who would then be directed to kill the person under control. ‘Throwdowns’ would be placed with the body, and a ‘cover story’ was created for the purposes of operational reporting and to deflect scrutiny. This was reinforced with a code of silence.
VC winner could be stripped of medal.
War hero Ben Roberts-Smith could be stripped of his Victoria Cross along with dozens of other elite soldiers if they are convicted over ‘war crimes’ in Afghanistan
I can now identify the soldier I named as “Soldier B” In Soul of Darkness as Ben Roberts-Smith. He was awarded the Australian Victoria Cross in 2011 for actions during an operation in Afghanistan in 2010, actions that it has been alleged were war crimes. The allegations have not been proven in a court of law as of this time, in fact no criminal charges have been laid as yet. However Maj.Gen. Brereton did recommend that the Chief of the Defense Force refer a total of 36 matters to the Australian Federal Police for criminal investigation, which relate to 23 seperate incidents and involving 19 individuals including Ben Roberts-Smith.
Roberts-Smith will likely retain the VC throughout the investigation and any subsequent trial, however should he be found guilty he will no doubt be stripped of it. The unfortunate thing about this is that because of the actions of a few men, as many as 3,000 soldiers in the Australian SAS will lose some of their medals when the whole regiment is stripped of group citations earned between 2005 and 2016, as is expected.
A letter from 10 SAS operators.
A group of SAS operatives penned an open letter to the Australian public last week with the title “They Are Not One Of Us.” These are the men who volunteered to serve their country and to die if necessary to protect the principle of the rule of law under which their country was founded. These are people who live by a code and to not live up to it means that they are unfit to serve in the SAS. It is a reminder that they shouldn’t be coloured by the actions of a very small minority.
We are the soldiers, the ‘Operators’ as we are known, who have served or are continuing to serve in the Special Air Service Regiment.
We have decided to speak, as one, to the Australian public, who have trusted us and invested in us to defend our country for over 60 years.
All of us have been carefully selected for the privilege of serving our country in the SASR. Our government has invested millions of dollars of public money in each one of us to provide you with unique and specialised capabilities in the defence of our nation.
Our regiment is now the subject of the longest inquiry into allegations of war crimes conducted by the Australian Defence Force. Accusations and allegations of war crimes as well as failures of leadership cut to the very core of the SASR. Such actions go against the very purpose of who we are as an organisation, and against the very nature of who we are as individuals.
We are not indifferent to human suffering. We do not have a callous disregard for human life. We are, however, selected for our unwavering moral compass, on which we proudly hang our Sandy Berets. We are not out of control. In fact, we have spent the majority of our professional soldiering careers in the SASR drilling and exercising, specifically to avoid casualties among non-combatants.
We define SASR mission success by how precisely we can apply the minimum amount of force to achieve a desired strategic outcome with the absolute minimum loss of human life. This is evident in the tens of thousands of missions and programs we have carried out around the world.
We are all singularly bound by the principle of “truth in reporting”. This principle underpins our single most important regimental capability: long-range surveillance and reconnaissance. Truth in reporting enables the SASR to act as the operational eyes and ears of the Australian Defence Force and the Australian government. Without truth in reporting, we are nothing.
As early as 2006, it was our commitment to truth in reporting that instigated what has now resulted in the four-year-long Brereton inquiry into allegations of war crimes in Afghanistan. Truth in reporting is why we speak up then and now.
The matters before us are of an extremely grave nature, and we accept that the impact of the Brereton inquiry may adversely affect former and current serving members and their families, as well as our strategic relationships with other coalition forces around the world. Whatever the outcome, we prefer our regimental history to reflect hard truths over comforting fantasy. If it can be destroyed by the truth, it deserves to be destroyed by the truth.
We also believe that the same principle of truth in reporting should be embraced by the media, so as not to unduly impugn the reputation of the SASR as a whole, or inadvertently imply improper behaviour committed by former or current serving members. Equally, we applaud accurate portrayals of misconduct provided it is supported by appropriate context and evidence.
Just as we embrace truth in reporting, we demand our leadership to do the same. Leaders are bound in their duty to convey what we have seen and reported and we hold them to the same standards to which we hold ourselves.
We hold our leadership to the same unforgiving standards to which we hold our teams, and ourselves, individually. It is our relentless pursuit of individual and organisational excellence that defines us as an organisation and a regiment.
We lead by example. On combat operations, we were forced to sacrifice many of our technological advantages over highly adaptive adversaries who knew no rules or bounds. We accepted continually shifting goal posts and decisions made by governments in the absence of a defined campaign outcome in Afghanistan. We begrudgingly accepted these strategic decisions while attempting to effectively operate in an environment characterised by uncertainty, danger and our own casualties.
We are not war criminals, nor have we ever set our morality aside. We are professional volunteer soldiers who frequently upheld the values of the Australian Army during a 10-year expeditionary campaign in the Middle East, despite the absence of any clear definition of victory.
We believe in the same legal principles that underpin the very fabric of Australian society, something that we have sworn to defend with our lives.
We support the removal from the regiment and legal prosecution of anyone found guilty of breaching the laws of armed conflict, the Geneva Convention or the rules of engagement. We outright reject and despise criminality in all its forms, especially in the context of soldiering. We support unbiased investigatory due process, the rule of law and the burden of proof. There is absolutely no place in the ADF, least of all in the SASR, for any individual who believes they are untouchable or above the law.
Having had full legal representation, should it be proven that any former or current serving individuals within the SASR have acted outside the law or the expected standards and behaviours demanded of an Australian soldier, we underline that we will wholeheartedly support their prosecution and removal from the regiment. They have acted against everything the SASR fights and stands for. They are not one of us.
We are committed to accepting the outcomes and consequences of the Brereton inquiry and to action its recommendations. Then we will return to the shadows where we belong. We do not seek to be glorified for our actions or demonstrating our moral courage. We only seek the validation that truth in reporting is who we are and what we do.
We are proud of the internal examinations into our regiment that have highlighted a culture of toughness and professionalism of the extraordinary men and women who do extraordinary work under extraordinary circumstances.
We are the tactical, operational and strategic eyes and ears for the ADF and the Australian government, with strategic and innovative capabilities to reach out and strike our adversaries when required.
We are soldiers, we are professionals, and we are Australians. We are committed to upholding the values of the Australian Defence Force. We believe in truth in reporting, moral courage and constant vigilance from the shadows in defence of Australia.
As of November 21st David McBride has had criminal charges pending against him for 626 days. That’s one year, eight months, and fifteen days that he has had the spectre of a lifelong prison sentence weighing on him. And for what exactly?
For having the temerity to think that he could call out senior military officials and politicians for their criminal behaviour? Or perhaps it was because he was going to ruin the good thing that they had going for themselves. With Rules of Engagement that weren’t entirely clear to the troops in the field, and so many blurred lines surrounding who is a combatant and who isn’t they set themselves up for success in a rather devious way.
It’s all about the popularity.
For any state that is at war one of the most important things to have is popular support for said war. One way that this can be achieved by appealing to and exploiting a nations sense of loss in the wake of the death of a soldier. It can at times unify a people to rally behind the troops to avenge those killed in action. These are also opportunities for politicians to exploit the situation for their political benefit. Being seen greeting a casket at the airport with a grieving family or showing up at a funeral can work to bump up a politicians popularity and polling numbers.
The other thing that any country loves to have are war heroes, especially ones awarded with the highest decoration there is to offer them as in this case with the Victoria Cross, perhaps the most prestigous of awards for valour and gallantry in the world. Once a hero has been made everything possible must be done to maintain the image and persona, because maintaining the myth is good for the public’s perception.
As a result the “hero” is able to get away with a lot he wouldn’t ordinarily be able to. For instance all Australian special forces operations were monitored from above using drones to a provide live video feed to commanders and others. It has been alleged that Roberts-Smith would tell a Brigadier to ensure that no drones would by overhead during any of his operations. It seems incredulous to me that senior commanders would not have been aware of what Roberts-Smith was up to.
As legal officer McBride was able to see what had been going on, and after noticing patterns in what he was seeing he took what he found to the authorities. For two years he tried his best to get someone at any official agency in Australia to act on what he found, only to be told that you can’t charge the government.
Time to dismiss the charges.
The findings of the Brereton Inquiry do nothing but exonerate David McBride. They back up what he had been saying the whole damn time, and for his troubles he has had the pleasure of having the government throw its weight against him in an attempt to punish him. They couldn’t and wouldn’t be able to silence him so they wanted to lock him away instead.
There is no reason for the government to pursue this case against McBride now, other that to try to wield the law like a sword against a citizen when it should be there as a shield.
It is my most fervent hope and expectation that the next article I write about David McBride will be when all the charges against him are dismissed and he can live out his life a free man.